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6 
Islam in Australia 
Shahram Akbarzadeh 
I slam in Australia is still a relatively new religion but its adherents have increased in number as a result of migration, conversion to Islam and 
the high birth rate among Muslim Australians. These three factors have 
put the share of the Muslim population in Australia on an upward 
trajectory. In 1947 the number of Muslims was negligible and did not 
register on the national census. By 1971 Muslim numbers had grown to a 
very modest 22,000-or less than 0.2 percent of the total population. 1 The 
1970s, however, was an important decade for Muslims in Australia. The 
Australian government had up to this point imposed racial restrictions on 
migration to Australia with the White Australia Policy barring migration 
from the Middle East and Asia. However, by the mid-1970s the Gough 
Whitlam government (1972-7 5) had brought significant changes and 
dropped the White Australia Policy. This shift in policy coincided with a 
series of upheavals in the Middle East which resulted in large population 
movements. The civil war in Lebanon in the 1970s was the first to 
generate demand for entry into Australia. This was followed by the Iran-
Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Gulf War of 1990-
91. These upheavals resulted in significant dislocation of the local 
population, some of whom found their way to Australia. As a result, by 
1996 the number of Muslims in Australia had grown to 201,000 or 1.1 
percent of the total population.2 In the national census of 2006, Muslims 
accounted for 340,000 or 1.7 percent of Australia's population.3 
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Muslim Australians are mostly concentrated in major metropolitan 
centers; Sydney and Melbourne are home to significant Muslim 
communities, with 161,163 Muslims in Sydney (3.9 percent) and 103,187 
Muslims in Melbourne (2.9 percent), and together constituting 78 percent 
of the total Muslim population of Australia. In some government housing 
areas the percentage of Muslims rises to well over 10 percent, for 
example: Hume (Victoria) 13.3 percent; Bankstown (NSW) 15.3 percent 
and Auburn (NSW) 24.8 percent. It is noteworthy that these areas are 
generally characterized by low income levels and high rates of 
unemployment. 
In the post-September 11 era, many questions are being asked about 
the place of Islam in Australia. The London bombings of July 7, 2005 -
the first successful suicide attack on western European soil carried out by 
four British-born men - catapulted into the public spotlight questions 
about the capacity of Muslims to integrate into secular, liberal 
democracies. Questions such as: Is there something intrinsic in Islam or 
the way Muslims practice their faith that makes it difficult for them to 
adapt to life in the West? To what extent do connections to the ancestral 
homelands affect loyalty to countries of residence? Are Western nations 
such as Australia merely countries of residence for Muslim migrants and 
their children, who otherwise long for a return to their true homelands? 
The underlying question that is being asked is no longer simply about 
Muslims' capacity to integrate, but whether Muslims living in Western 
countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, are a fifth column 
for global jihad. 
A growing body of literature on the underlying causes of extremism 
points to unfulfilled expectations as a critical factor. From this point of 
view, it is not so much poverty, unemployment and deprivation 
themselves that cause alienation and extremism, although they may well 
contribute to it, but a sense that one's aspirations and expectations are not 
being fulfilled; a sense that the system does not allow an individual or a 
group of individuals to excel. It is this perception of blocked progress that 
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plays a significant role in alienating the affected group from the social and 
political system which appears indifferent - or even hostile - to them. In 
addition to this individual sense of alienation, is the community 
experience of migration - complete with all the usual migrant challenges 
of acclimation - that helps generate group solidarity and a sense of 
common purpose in the affected group, often based on a "victimhood" 
mentality. 
One prominent feature of the public discourse on the future of 
Muslims in Australia is that Muslims constitute the object of analysis in 
an unequal power relationship. Muslim voices on pertinent issues of 
citizenship and multiculturalism, to name just two key policy areas, are 
largely absent. This unequal access to the public domain of opinion 
making tends to result in a gap in our understanding of "the Muslim 
question." The diversity of opinion among Muslims, as well as the many 
nuances belonging to cultural and religious traditions, are rarely reflected 
in public discourse. This distorted and homogenizing view presents an 
intellectual and policy challenge. This present study, which examines the 
opinions and attitudes of Muslim Australians living in greater 
metropolitan Melbourne, is an attempt to meet this challenge. 
The Debate 
The current debate on Muslim integration and belonging has fueled a 
broader debate on Australian multiculturalism. Issues regarding the 
appearance of Muslim women's dress in public places and Islamic 
education, for example, have been linked to the question of social 
integration and whether multicultural policy facilitates or hinders social 
cohesion. 
A growing trend in public commentary in Australia emphasizes an 
apparent contradiction between promoting multiculturalism on the one 
hand, and social integration on the other.4 From this perspective, 
multiculturalism has justified the preservation, even promotion, of non-
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Anglo ethnic identities and has obscured the need for the integration of 
ethnic minorities into the broader society. This criticism of 
multiculturalism implicitly asserts that the right of non-Anglo ethnic 
groups to their own cultural identities comes at the expense of social 
cohesion and the integrity of the national unit. Multiculturalism is 
assumed to have failed to integrate Muslims because it has allowed the 
emergence of autonomous cultural enclaves that clash in character and 
nature with the broader host society.5 
Adding to the complexity of the problem, multiculturalism is itself a 
contested concept. In the United Kingdom, multiculturalism was not 
designed to protect minority religious groups, as demonstrated in the 
failure of the British courts to protect Islam against blasphemy in the 
Salman Rushdie affair of the late l 980s.6 In the context of the United 
Kingdom, Tariq Modood has argued that multiculturalism often falls short 
of its objective of mutual integration between majority and minority 
cultures.7 Reflecting on the broader European experience, Olivier Roy is 
less circumspect about multiculturalism, arguing that it "tends to create 
ghettos. "8 
In contrast, James Jupp has pointed to the initial notion of "cultural 
plurality" as the foundation of the nascent policy of multiculturalism in 
Australia. 9 Theoretically, multicultural policies have been formulated and 
implemented not to exclude ethnic minorities, but to facilitate their active 
involvement in the social and political framework of the nation. In 
Canada, for example, multiculturalism was initially concerned with the 
Anglo and Francophone communities, the two dominant groups which 
aspired to full citizenship. In Australia and the United Kingdom, the 
implementation of multiculturalism has come about in recognition of the 
growth of migrating non-Anglo communities in the post-Word War II era, 
which needed to be incorporated in the national community. Jupp argues 
that Australian multicultural policies had a direct link with immigration 
policies. ' 0 Given the current public discourse on the value of 
multiculturalism for social cohesion, it is important to be mindful of the 
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extent to which multiculturalism has contributed to the generation of a 
sense of loyalty to the national unit among Muslims in Australia. 
Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity, outlines the Australian 
Government's official policy of Australian multiculturalism. The 
statement recognizes the reality of cultural diversity in Australian society 
and marries this with an expectation of loyalty to the nation. The policy 
describes four principles of Australian multiculturalism: 1) the civic duty 
of all to respect the basic structures and principles ensuring and enabling 
freedom, equality and diversity in Australian society; 2) reciprocal 
cultural respect for all Australians to express their varying cultures and 
beliefs, subject to the law; 3) social equity, which entitles all to equality of 
treatment and opportunity including freedom from discrimination against 
race, culture, religion, language, location, gender or birthplace; and 4) the 
notion that productive diversity in the population benefits Australia and 
her people. 
At this point it is worth noting that the concepts of belonging, social 
integration and citizenship are not legalistic issues. Instead, they are 
embedded in psychological and emotional affiliations to the land. Saied R. 
Ameli and Arzu Merali, researching British Muslims, have argued that 
citizenship is about an emotional connection to the state, or belonging to 
the homeland and civic citizenship. Without this emotional connection, 
"citizenship is sterile." 11 The existing literature suggests that Muslim 
attitudes to citizenship under secular rule in liberal democracies are mixed 
and ill-defined. Humayun Ansari, 12 Tariq Modood, 13 as well as Saied R. 
Ameli and Arzu Merali14 have documented the diversity of opinion in the 
United Kingdom. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the radical 
group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) offer clear examples of divergent views among 
British Muslims. The MCB was formed in 1997 and while not universally 
accepted as the peak representative body, 15 has grown to an organization 
with over 350 affiliated Muslim organizations throughout the United 
Kingdom. The MCB has effectively negotiated its way through the 
difficult days of the British decision to join the US invasion of Iraq and 
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the July 2005 London bombings. These events, and others before them, 
intensified racial and religious tensions placing Muslims in a difficult 
situation in that they were often asked to choose between two alternatives 
assumed to be mutually exclusive: loyalty to Britain or to Islam. In reality, 
the situation is never as clear as an absolute dichotomy. The MCB has 
consistently condemned terrorism and called on local Muslims to 
cooperate with authorities to root out terrorism. However, MCB leaders 
such as the previous and current secretary generals, Sir Iqbal Sacranie and 
Dr. Muhammad Abdul Bari, have asserted the right of Muslims to express 
public opinions on issues such as national security and foreign policy. 
Recently, the MCB campaigned against the British government's 
determination to apply legislative amendments such as the clause on 
outlawing the "glorification of terrorism," citing a concern that the 
amendments would negatively affect British Muslims. While asserting the 
right of Muslims to express dissent, the MCB is committed to an inclusive 
sense of citizenship stating, "We are British citizens with an Islamic 
heritage. " 16 
In contrast, HT has adopted an uncomprom1smg attitude towards 
citizenship in the United Kingdom and Australia. According to this fringe 
organization, accepting citizenship is tantamount to betraying Islam, as it 
entails forgoing the sovereignty of God for that of Man. HT, and its 
offshoot al-Muhajiroun in the United Kingdom as well as a host of other 
groups that operate on the fringes of Muslim communities, reject 
multicultural policies as a cover for the assimilation and dissolution of 
Muslim identity. 17 
A number of Muslim scholars have challenged the rejectionist 
pronunciations of fringe Islamic groups and the far-right commentary on 
the incompatibility of Muslim identity and loyalty to a secular state in the 
West. Foremost among them are Tariq Ramadan, Khaled Abou El Fadl 
and Abdullahi A. An-Na'im. In an early publication, Abou El Fadl 
highlighted the importance of thinking outside the medieval Muslim 
division of the world into dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb 
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(abode of war), and called for the intellectual acceptance that states (not 
traditionally perceived as belonging to the Muslim political structure) are 
now home to permanent Muslim populations. In his 1994 article, "Islamic 
Law and Muslim Minorities," Abou El Fadl argued that, by and large, 
Muslims have not come to grips with the ethical or legal principles that 
should govern their lives in their new homelands. 18 Accordingly, the 
reality of living in the West calls for a creative approach to Islam and 
what it means to be Muslim. 
Tariq Ramadan has built on the above critique of the traditional 
division of the world between Islamic and non-Islamic, insisting that the 
growing presence of Muslims in Europe offers novel opportunities. Rather 
than seeing the phenomenon as a negative challenge, Ramadan in his aptly 
titled book To be a European Muslim, argues that Muslims should 
embrace the opportunity to foster their faith in the liberal environment of 
Europe. 19 This theme has been developed further in subsequent 
publications elaborating on the universality of Islamic values and 
principles that can engage with the European social and legal systems.20 
From Ramadan's perspective, living in a free society where the rule of 
law reigns supreme, frees Muslims from the cultural and political 
constraints that have traditionally thwarted innovation. The novelty of this 
experience, Ramadan continues, has necessitated an "intellectual 
revolution" to move Muslims from a mindset of marginalized minority to 
active Muslim citizens of their new homelands.21 
In Australia, the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV) has established 
itself as an advocate of reconciling "Muslim-ness" and "Australian-ness." 
The ICV has been the most energetic Islamic body to reject the assumed 
contradiction between Australian citizenship and Islamic devotion. This 
may be partly due to the youthful nature of the ICV leadership. Discussing 
a somewhat similar phenomenon in Europe, Felice Dassetto and Jorgen 
Nielson have argued that emerging young Muslim leaders have made a 
mark for themselves as they seek constructive engagement with the 
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broader community. "They want to participate, to be recognized and 
respected as native citizens, but as Muslim native citizens."22 
The academic literature in Australia on this topic is less vibrant than in 
Europe, perhaps reflecting the very young nature of Muslim Australian 
communities and the rather limited depth of research in this field. The first 
comprehensive empirical survey on the significance of mosques for newly 
arrived Muslim migrants to Australia was conducted by Gary Bouma.23 
Bilal Cleland undertook a broad survey of the history of Muslim contact 
with, and settlement in, Australia from before European colonization,24 
which was followed by Nahid Kabir's historical narrative of Muslims and 
religious and racial stereotyping in Australia. 25 In the new century two 
interpretive publications appeared, both aimed at examining the Muslim 
experience in Australia.26 
Only a handful of publications have grappled with "the Muslim 
question," most noteworthy are Michael Humphrey's study of the 
Lebanese community in Sydney against the backdrop of socio-economic 
challenges they face as a minority group, as well as Jock Collins' work 
looking at the issue of racial and religious stereotyping of the Lebanese 
Muslim community in relation to criminal acts in Sydney's southwestern 
suburbs.27 
In 2004, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
released the report Isma' - Listen: National Consultations on Eliminating 
Prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians. The report explores the 
rise in racial and religious vilification of Arabs and Muslims in Australia, 
particularly in light of global and local crisis events involving Muslims. 
As the above account of the existing literature demonstrates, there has 
not been a publication on the socio-economic experiences of Muslim 
Australians in relation to their social and political attitudes. The present 
study builds on previous research dealing with Muslim identity, loyalty to 
the nation-state, multiculturalism and citizenship in order to contextualize 
the research findings; therefore, the outcome of this study presents a fresh 
and empirical assessment. 
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Research Objectives 
It is the objective of the current study to examine the socio-economic 
standing and expectations of Muslim Australians, and test markers for 
integration in society. Integration is a complex, multidimensional process. 
It includes social, cultural, economic and spiritual processes of growing 
roots in society and developing a sense of belonging. By its very nature, 
this sense of belonging needs to be reciprocated by the broader society 
that accepts migrants into the community. This mutual understanding 
between the migrant community and the host society is critical for 
genuine integration. 
Emphasis in the current study is placed on two markers to indicate 
levels of integration: educational achievement and professional/vocational 
advancement. This assists in assessing the relevance and extent of 
(un)fulfilled expectations - critical in the process of integration - or 
alternatively alienation. 
Key questions in this study include: What are the barriers to integration? 
Are they institutional and/or subjective? If Muslims have not been able to 
achieve the professional jobs they aspire to, what are the obstacles 
preventing them? What have those experiencing obstacles done to address 
them? Have Muslim migrants taken up services available to them for 
professional re-training where needed? Are English language skills a 
problem? How have educational opportunities affected socio-economic 
advancement among Muslims? What impact does higher education have on 
social and political outlook? In all, to what extent have Muslim Australians 
living in Melbourne managed to integrate into society? 
Methodology 
The survey was carried out in Melbourne, Australia, in 2007 and involved 
502 respondents.28 A special questionnaire was prepared dealing with key 
socio-economic indicators as well as attitudinal questions regarding social 
and political policies in Australia. The respondents were all Muslim, 
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predominantly involved in Islamic community organizations. The bias in 
the sample was deliberate. A starting assumption for the project was that 
less religiously inclined Muslims, so-called cultural Muslims, who are not 
active in Islamic community organizations are likely to experience less 
difficulty in accepting the governing mores of secular life. The other side 
of this coin was that the more religiously devout Muslims had trouble 
"fitting in." Frequent media coverage of Islam focused on this group of 
Australian Muslims. Even though devout Muslims may not represent all 
Muslims, the picture that has emerged in the media and the public debate 
has given prominence to the devout and socially active section of 
Australian Muslims. It was, therefore, imperative to carry out a focused 
study on this group. 
The age group of the sample represented the above rationale. More 
than 60 percent of the respondents were under 30 years of age, 32 percent 
were between 30 and 50 years and only 6 percent were over 50. It was 
assumed that the younger generation of Muslims, active in communal life 
and performing religious rituals, were likely to exhibit signs of alienation 
and feelings of separation. The question of youth delinquency and 
alienation has been a recurring theme in Australian media and police 
reports, most recently focused on Muslim youth. It was therefore 
important to ensure the research project captured a large sample from this 
demographic cluster. 
Findings 
It was revealing that the overall majority of those surveyed had a very positive 
view of life in Australia. They viewed Australia as a country where they could 
live free of religious persecution, where the overarching social values of the 
country did not contradict their Islamic values. These findings were quite 
significant, as they sit contrary to assumptions of a wide divergence between 
Australian and Islamic values. These findings also challenge assumptions about 
the capacity of devout Muslims to live under secular rule. 
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The Australian political system corresponds to the secular axiom of 
the division between church and state. In the recent past, this point has 
been challenged by some Australian commentators who argue that this 
separation is artificial and deprives society of a profound source of 
moral inspiration and guidance. This dissenting view, it is important to 
note, does not come from Muslim intellectuals, but is being expressed 
by Christian commentators. In the present study, nearly 70 percent of the 
respondents expressed satisfaction with the political system in Australia, 
with an additional 10 percent who did not respond to that question. So in 
effect, only a small minority of 22 percent expressed dissatisfaction with 
the Australian political system. This percentage is not negligible, but 
certainly less overwhelming than some media reports have suggested. 
The percentage equates to 110 respondents. We may speculate that about 
a third of the Australian Muslim total of 340,000 would fall in the 
category of religiously devout and active in community organizations, 
i.e. 113,300 people. By extension, just under 25,000 Muslims in 
Australia could show dissatisfaction with the political system. This 
number is obviously a rough estimate. Figure 6.1 represents the three 
categories of response in relation to the question: "Are you comfortable 
living under Australia's political system?" 
The question of satisfaction with living conditions in Australia 
receives an even greater endorsement by the respondents when asked 
about religious freedom. Respondents were asked "can you practice Islam 
as you wish in Australia?" Nearly 80 percent said yes, while 10 percent 
said no. This is a firm endorsement of the Australian political, social, and 
legal system that provides the framework for religious freedom. There 
were, however, some concerns about performing daily rituals in the 
workplace. The two most common issues were the prayer and hijab. 
Muslim women in hijab continue to attract unwanted attention in respect 
to their supposed inability to lead rich and fulfilling lives. Such women 
may be viewed by non-Muslim commentators as living proof of Muslims' 
patriarchal mentality. From this perspective the hijab embodies the 
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subjugation of women to male control. Media commentator Janet Albrechtsen 
(The Australian) has been the most vocal proponent of this view. 
Figure 6.1 
Percentage of Muslims Comfortable Living under 
Australia's Political System 
Yes-68% 
------ - - - - - - ---- ---
Source: Akbarzadeh Shahram (Australian Department oflmmigration and Citizenship). 
The respondents, however, expressed a very different view on the hijab. 
Although patriarchy may exist among Muslims, as it does among other 
communities, the respondents rejected its connection with the hijab. Instead 
the respondents were frustrated by the negative image of the hijab and 
Muslims in general and the need for them to constantly justify their beliefs 
and practices. In the words of one respondent: "People have gross 
misconceptions about my beard and my wife's hijab. It therefore becomes 
difficult to behave naturally-we have to prove our civility." This sense of 
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the constant questioning of loyalties and the need to repeatedly justify 
oneself was a major issue for most respondents. According to a 
respondent "I constantly find myself having to justify both [being a good 
Muslim and a good Australian]. It shouldn't be like that. All the 
Australian values of giving a fair go and all that don't seem to be 
applied fully to the Muslim community in Australia." 
The above question regarding religious affiliation related to a 
controversy following a suggestion that Australian Muslims wished to 
establish Shari'a law in Australia. The Howard Government's Treasurer, 
Peter Costello, suggested in a November 2005 interview that if Muslims 
could not accept Australian law, they should leave the country.29 This 
became a recurring theme in Costello's subsequent interviews and public 
addresses. The main thrust of his message drew a line between Islamic 
and Australian values. In his thinking the two were simply incompatible. 
This view, however, has been challenged by a number of commentators 
who have rejected this absolutist approach as unfounded and damaging 
to Australia's multicultural fabric. The argument that Islamic and 
Australian values are somehow poles apart and irreconcilable is not 
substantiated in a recent study, carried out in Sydney. 
This study found that being a good Muslim and a good citizen in 
Australia is a natural state of mind for the great majority of Muslims. 
Over 80 percent of the respondents30 saw no contradiction between the 
two. Instead they often suggested that one reinforced the other. 
According to one respondent Islam is all about spirituality and being a 
good person, qualities that are important for a good citizen: "Being a 
Muslim in any part of the world means belief, good deeds, education and 
help[ing] thy neighbor." Other respondents reinforced this message. A 
Syrian-born respondent said: "I see no opposition between being a good 
loyal Australian citizen and a Muslim, since Islamic values teach me to 
love and work diligently towards the betterment of any community I live 
in." This sentiment was echoed by an Afghan refugee: 
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Figure 6.2 
Satisfaction with Government and Policy 
80.00%~-----------------~ 
70.00%-+---------
60.00%-+---------
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30.00% 
20.00% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
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Security policy 
2. Satisfaction 
with Aust. 
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policy 
3. Satisfaction 
with Aust. 
Government 
D Satisfied 
• Not Satisfied 
D Neutral 
Source: Akbarzadeh Shahram (Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship). 
It may be that similar levels of dissatisfaction were also prevalent in 
other sections of Australian society, as the Howard Government 's record 
was divisive. Australia' s close ties with the United States and its readiness 
to commit to the "war on terror" caused upset in many liberal circles. Yet, 
the level of dissatisfaction with the Howard Government's performance 
gains greater significance once explored in the context of a systemic 
socio-economic trend of marginalization. 
Socio-economic Marginalization? 
The last Australian Census highlighted a worrying discrepancy in terms of 
living standards and access to wealth among Muslims and non-Muslims. 
In 2006 Muslim households were clustered in the low-income bracket, 
with two percent registering no income. This was twice the figure for non-
Muslim Australians. In terms of home ownership, an indicator of financial 
security and a foundation of the "Australian dream," Muslims registered 
only 15 percent, while home ownership among non-Muslim Australians 
stood at 33 percent, or a third of the population. Nearly 45 percent of 
Muslim households comprised rental accommodation. 31 
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The figures for employment reinforce the above picture. While 
unemployment rates for non-Muslims in the prime age of 25-45 stood at 
five percent, the Muslim unemployment rate was 12 percent for the same 
age group. These figures suggest that financial security and poverty are a 
serious issue for Muslims. Professor Riaz Hassan, who has studied these 
figures closely, makes a chilling observation: 
The Australian benchmark of poverty is household income equivalent to 
A$650 or less (which was 60 percent of the average male weekly wage in 
2006). Using this benchmark, the census data shows that 40 percent of 
Muslim Australian children were living in poverty. Muslim children were 
twice more likely to live in poverty than non-Muslim children.32 . 
Conclusion 
This survey suggests conflicting trends. On the one hand, the respondents 
register a clear sense of optimism about life in Australia, about the 
compatibility of social values, prospects for personal advancement and 
religious observation. There is a clear commitment to education and 
census data substantiates Muslims' achievements in gaining higher 
education degrees. 
On the other hand the pattern of socio-economic experiences among 
Muslims 1s discouraging. It suggests clear disadvantage and 
marginalization. Muslim Australians are at the lower end of income, 
employment and wealth. Added to these factors is a clear sense of 
dissatisfaction with the media and the government. While it may be 
premature to refer to a sense of alienation among Muslims, it is clear 
that Muslims see themselves as a "target" community. The media 
representation of Muslims as potential terrorists and government 
security policy, which is widely seen as targeting the Muslim 
community, have contributed to a sense of siege. This sense counter-
balances the more favorable views of Australia. 
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It may be argued that while optimism regarding the place of Muslims 
in Australia is based on more deep-rooted and generic qualities of life, 
dissatisfaction is grounded in time-specific events and policies. 
Consequently, there maybe room for a positive outlook if policies are 
reversed and sources of dissatisfaction are addressed by tangible means. 
However, policy reorientation alone is unlikely to provide the ultimate 
solution to Australia's "Muslim question." The pervasive siege mentality 
colored by genuine socio-economic disadvantages has the potential to 
impact on impressionable Muslim youth, leading to self-imposed 
segregation from the broader society. This is a serious challenge to 
Australia and its Muslim population. 
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